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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CIVIL RIGHTS: Tribal Membership
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670 (1978), concerned
a 1939 Pueblo ordinance which precludes membership for children
of female members of the Pueblo who had married nonmembers,
but grants membership to children of male members of the Pueblo
who had married nonmembers. The suit was brought against the
Pueblo and its governor alleging that the ordinance discriminates
on the basis of both sex and ancestry and thus violates Title I of
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) [25 U.S.C. §§ 13011303]. Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the ordinance.'
The Court held that (1) suits against the tribe under the ICRA
are barred by the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit because
nothing on the face of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the
jurisdiction of federal courts in civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief.' (2) Section 1302 does not impliedly authorize a
private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Pueblo's governor. Congress' failure to provide remedies other
than habeas corpus for enforcement of the ICRA was deliberate,
as is manifest from the structure of the statutory scheme and the
legislative history. (a) Congress was committed to the goal of
tribal self-determination, as evidenced by the provisions of Title I
itself. Section 1302 selectively incorporated and in some instances
modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique needs
of tribal governments and thus manifests a congressional purpose
to protect tribal sovereignty from undue interference. (b) Tribal
courts are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA. (c) It
is clear that only the limited review mechanism of Section 1303
was contemplated by Congress. (d) Congress may also have considered that resolution of statutory issues under Section 1302 will
frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom that
tribal forums may be in better position to evaluate than federal
courts.

1. See Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo-SexualEquality Underthe Indian Civil rightsAct (this issue).
2. See Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Membership
and the Indian CivilRights Act (this issue).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Discrimination Between an Indian
and a Non-Indian Charged With a Crime on a Federal Enclave
Respondents, enrolled Coeur d'Alene Indians, were charged with
several crimes committed within the boundaries of their reservations, including the murder of a non-Indian. Two of the respondents were convicted of first-degree murder under the felony
murder provisions of the federal enclave murder statute, as made
applicable to Indians by the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court
on the ground that respondents had been denied their constitutional rights under the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's due process clause. The court of appeals agreed with
respondents' contention that their felony murder convictions were
racially discriminatory as a non-Indian charged with the same
crime would have been subject to prosecution only under Idaho
law, under which premeditation and deliberation would have had
to be proved, whereas no such elements were required under the
felony murder statute.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of United States
v. Antelope, 'reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court
relied on the cases of Morton v. Mancari2 and Fisher v. District
Court' for the proposition that federal regulation of Indian affairs
is not based upon impermissible classifications. Instead, such
regulation is rooted in the unique status of Indians as a "separate
people" with their own political institutions. Federal regulation of
Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign political
communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a "racial
group" consisting of Indians. Indeed, respondents were not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction because they were of the Indian race, but because they were enrolled tribal members.
Therefore, the federal criminal statutes enforced here are not based on impermissible racial classification.' The Supreme Court
found no violation of equal protection, as Indians under the Major
Crimes Act enjoy all privileges of others within federal enclaves.
Turning to the disparity between federal and Idaho law, the Court
found that Congress has constitutional power to prescribe a
criminal code in Indian country. Thus, under our federal system,
the national government does not violate equal protection when
1. 9' S.Ct. 1395 (1977).
2. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
3. 424 U.S. 382(1976).

4. United States v. Antelope, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1399 (1977).
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its own body of law is even-handed, regardless of laws of states
with respect to the same subject matter.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Supremacy of the United States
Constitution Over a Conflicting Provision of a Tribal
Constitution
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, No. 77-1208 (8th Cir.
December 16, 1977), the question presented was whether the
tribal constitution, which provided for voter age of 21, or the
United States Constitution, which provided for voter age of 18,
controlled in a tribal election to amend the tribal constitution. The
court of appeals held that the provision of the United States Constitution applied. In reaching that conclusion, the Court discussed
the source of tribal government, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. and the
powers of the Secretary of the Interior under that act. The
Secretary is given broad powers to promulgate rules and regulations for tribal elections. When the twenty-sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution was ratified, the Secretary took the
position that this amendment superseded the 21-year-old voter age
requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 479. In October of 1976, the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe requested that the Secretary call an election to
amend the tribal constitution. The Secretary complied, stating
that all persons over 18 years of age were eligible to vote. The
court of appeals adopted its statement in a previous case that
secretarial elections are specific federal elections regulated by
federal statute to which the provisions of the twenty-sixth amendment apply. Therefore, the Secretary had authority to require that
the eligible voting age for adult Indians with respect to the adoption of a tribal constitutional amendment be 18 years of age.
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: Indian Country
United States v. Littlechief, No. CR-76-207-D (W.D. Okla.
November 7, 1977); adopted in State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263
(Okla. Cr. 1978). The defendant in this case was charged with
murder. It was conceded that the land where the alleged murder
took place is part of an original Kiowa allotment and held in trust
by the federal government. The United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma held that the land in question is
"Indian country" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) and,
therefore, the state has no jurisdiction because it is exclusive
federal territory. This construction was also adopted by the
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and is considered binding
on the state.
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS: State Regulation of Fishing
Activities of the Puyallup Tribe, Both On and Off the Reservation
After thirteen years of litigation, including two decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, the Superior Court of the State of
Washington entered a judgment against the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. That judgment declared that the court had jurisdiction to
regulate the fishing activities of the tribe both on and off its reservation, and limited the number of steelhead trout that members of
the tribe could catch with nets in the Puyallup River each year.
The tribe was directed to file a list of members authorized to exercise treaty fishing rights, and to report the number of steelhead
caught by its treaty fishermen to the Washington State Department of Game, and to the court, each week. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington. The United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, which vacated
and remanded the portion of the case in which the state court had
ordered relief against the tribe itself, held that the tribe enjoyed
sovereign immunity from suit.' However, individual members of
the Puyallup Tribe remained subject to the regulation of fishing
activities by the Washington courts, and the limit imposed on the
total number of steelheads which could be caught by the Indians
was based upon a valid conservation scheme. The Supreme Court
advised the tribe that although it could resist the order of the state
court requiring that it provide information with respect to the
status of enrolled members and the size of their catch, the best interests of its members might be served by voluntarily providing
such information to the court in order to minimize the risk of an
erroneous enforcement effort.
In a concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun questioned the continued validity of the doctrine of
tribal immunity, and urged that it be reexamined in a future case.
A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justice Marshall, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the substantive rights of the Puyallup Indians. Justice Brennan was
of the opinion that Article II of the Treaty of Medicine Creek
granted the Puyallup Tribe the exclusive right to fish on its reservation,. normally not subject to state control. Therefore, Justice
Brennan would reverse and remand for a determination by the
1. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 97 S.Ct. 2616 (1977).
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state courts, what measures, if any, are necessary to regulate the
Puyallup's on-reservation fishery, strictly for conservation purposes.
JURISDICTION: The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over
Non-Indians
The most recent United States Supreme Court case is that of
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978), decided March 6, 1978. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner
Oliphant, a non-Indian resident of the Port Madison Reservation,
was arrested by tribal authorities and charged with assaulting a
tribal officer and resisting arrest. After arraignment in the tribal
court, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The
writ was denied, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the denial. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of
six, reversed the court of appeals, and held that Indian tribal
courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non Indians. The Supreme Court based its conclusion upon four findings: (a) From the earliest treaties with Indian tribes, it was
assumed that the tribes, few of which maintained any semblance
of a formal court system, did not have such jurisdiction absent a
congressional statute or treaty provision to that effect, and at least
one court held that such jurisdiction did not exist; (b) Congressional actions during the nineteenth century reflected that body's
belief that Indian tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians; (c) The presumption, commonly shared by
Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts, that
tribal courts have no power to try non-Indians, carries considerable weight; (d) By submitting to the overriding sovereignty
of the United States, Indian tribes necessarily yield the power to
try non-Indians except in a manner acceptable to Congress, a fact
which seems to be recognized by the Treaty of Point Elliott, signed
by the Suquamish Indian Tribe. Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by
the Chief Justice, rendered the following dissenting opinion: "I
agree with the court below that the 'power to preserve order on
the reservation.., is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed." In the absence of affirmative

1. 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
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withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view that Indian tribes
enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right
to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal
law within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent."
LEGISLATION
This Act was introduced as S. 661 by Senators Bellmon (R-OK)
and Bartlett (R-OK) on February 7, 1977. It has now been enacted
as Public Law 95-281, 92 Stat. 30. It reads as follows:
AN ACT
To reinstate the Modoc, Wyandotte, Peoria, and Ottawa Indian
Tribes of Oklahoma as federally supervised and recognized Indian
tribes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
(a)That Federal recognition is hereby extended or confirmed with
respect to the Wyandotte Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Ottawa
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, and the Peoria Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, the provisions of the Acts repealed by subsection (b)
of the section notwithstanding.
(b) The following Acts are hereby repealed:
(1)The Act of August 1, 1956 (70 Stat. 893; 25 U.S.C. 791-807)
relating to the Wyandotte Tribe;
(2) The Act of August 2, 1956 (70 Stat. 937; 25 U.S.C. 821-826)
relating to the Peoria Tribe; and
(3) The Act of August 3, 1956 (70 Stat. 963; 25 U.S.C. 841-853)
relating to the Ottawa Tribe.
(c) There are hereby reinstated all rights and privileges of each of
the tribes described in subsection (a) of this section and their
members under Federal treaty, statute, or otherwise which may
have been diminished or lost pursuant to the Act relating to them
which is repealed by subsection (b) of this section. Nothing contained in this Act shall diminish any rights or privileges enjoyed
by each of such tribes or their members now or prior to enactment
of such Act, under Federal treaty, statute, or otherwise, which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
(d) Except as specifically provided in this Act, nothing contained
in this Act shall alter any property rights or obligations, any contractual rights or obligations, including existing fishing rights, or
any obligation for taxes already levied.
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Sec. 2. (a) (1) The Modoc Indian Tribe of Oklahoma is hereby
recognized as a tribe of Indians residing in Oklahoma and the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1936, as amended (49 Stat. 1967; 25
U.S.C. 501-509), are hereby extended to such tribe and its
members. The Secretary of the Interior shall promptly offer the
said Modoc Tribe assistance to aid them in organizing under section 3 of said Act of June 26, 1936 (25 U.S.C. 503).
(2) The provisions of the Act of August 13, 1954 (68 Stat. 718;
25 U.S.C. 564-564w), hereafter shall not apply to the Modoc Tribe
of Oklahoma or its members except for any right to share in the
proceeds of any claim against the United States as provided in sections 6(c) and 21 of said Act, as amended (25 U.S.C. 564e and
564t).
(3) The Modoc Indian Tribe of Oklahoma shall consist of those
Modoc Indians who are direct lineal descendants of those Modocs
removed to Indian territory (now Oklahoma) in November 1973,
and who did not return to Klamath, Oregon, pursuant to the Act
of March 9, 1909 (35 Stat. 751) as determined by the Secretary of
the Interior, and the descendants of such Indians who otherwise
meet the membership requirements adopted by the tribe.
(b) The Secretary of the Interior shall promptly offer the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma and the Peoria Tribe of Oklahoma
assistance to aid them in reorganizing under section 3 of the Act of
June 26, 1936 (49 Stat. 1967; 25 U.S.C. 503), which Act is reextended to them and their members by this Act.
(c ) The validity of the organization of the Wyandotte Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma under section 3 of the Act of June 26, 1936 (49
Stat. 1967; 25 U.S.C. 503), and the continued application of said
Act to such tribe and its members is hereby confirmed.
Sec. 3. (a) It is hereby declared that enactment of this Act fulfills
the requirements of the first proviso in section 2 of the Act of
January 2, 1975 (88 Stat. 1920, 1921). with respect to the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma, the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma, and the
Peoria Tribe of Oklahoma.
(b) It is hereby declared that the organization of the Modoc
Tribe of Oklahoma as provided in section 3 (a) of this Act shall
fulfill the requirements of the second proviso in section 2 of the
Act of January 2, 1975 (88 Stat. 1920, 1921).
(c) Promptly after organization of the Modoc Tribe of
Oklahoma, the Secretary of the Interior shall publish a notice of
such fact in the Federal Register including a statement that such
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organization completes fulfillment of the requirements of the provisos in section 2 of the Act of January 2, 1975 (88 Stat. 1920,
1921), and that the land described in section I of said Act is held in
trust by the United States for the eight tribes named in said Act.
Sec. 4. The Wyandotte, Ottawa, Peoria, and Modoc Tribes of
Oklahoma and their members shall be entitled to participate in the
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians, including but not limited to
those under the Act of November 2, 1921 (42 Stat. 208; 25 U.S.C.
13), and for purposes of the Act of August 16, 1957 (71 Stat. 370;
42 U.S.C. 2005-2005F). The members of such tribes shall be deemed to be Indians for which hospital and medical care was being
provided by or at the expense of the Public Health Service on
August 16, 1957. Approved May 16, 1978.
LEGISLATION
Act of February17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-232, 92 Stat. 30 Purpose: To provide for the return to the United States of title to certain lands conveyed to certain Indian pueblos of New Mexico, and
for such land to be held in trust by the United States for such
tribes.
Act of March 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-247, 92 Stat. 158 Purpose: Authorizing the Wichita Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, and its
affiliated bands and groups of Indians, to file with the Indian
Claims Commission any of their claims against the United States
for lands taken without adequate compensation, and for other
purposes.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Senate Bill 2712: The Indian Program Evaluation and Needs
Assessment Act
This bill was introduced March 6, 1978 by Senator James
Abourezk (D-S.D.). S. 2712 would require all federal agencies
which administer special programs and services for Indians to provide an annual report to Congress which would contain information critical to the Congress in evaluating the effectiveness of the
various federally funded Indian programs. Such reports would
allow Congress to monitor the efficiency and fiscal accountability
of the agencies administering the programs, as well as stay current
on the fluctuating status of Indian lands.
In addition, the bill would require that a comprehensive needs
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assessment study be conducted every five years so that Congress
can more realistically evaluate the needs of Indians throughout the
country. The bill would also establish a Federal Interagency Council on Indian Affairs to coordinate federal Indian programs,
policy, and budgetary planning to increase efficiency and avoid
duplication within the various agencies serving Indians.
Senate Bill 2375: TribalRecognition Bill
S. 2375 provides for the establishment within the Interior
Department of a special investigative office which would, within
one year of enactment of the bill, contact all known Indian tribal
groups in the United States whose existence previously has not
been acknowledged and inform such tribes of their right to petition for acknowledgement. The office would be required to offer
the petitioning group technical assistance in preparing its petition
for recognition and assist them in the organization of their
members. Within two years of receiving a group's petition, the office must submit a written preliminary report to the petitioning
group for its response. The office would then have 30 days after
the petitioner's response to prepare a final report to be submitted
to the group and to the Secretary of Interior. The Secretary would
then have six months in which to decide whether to designate the
group as a federally acknowledged Indian tribe. The bill also
clearly outlines the definitions the office and the Secretary of Interior shall use in determining whether or not a group is a tribe.
TAXATION: State Sales Tax
Ute Indian Tribe v. State Tax Commission of Utah, No. 76 -1602
(10th Cir. February17, 1978). This action was brought by the Ute
Indian Tribe against the Utah State Tax Commission for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that Utah sales taxes could
not be levied or collected on sales of personal property made by a
tribal enterprise within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation. The complaint also sought return of funds collected
by the tribe on the sales and remitted to the state. The trial court
enjoined the state from seeking to collect sales taxes on sales made
by the tribe on the reservation, and directed the return of the
monies. On the basis of Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes,' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that sales
on trust lands by the tribe to Indians are not subject to the state
sales tax, although sales tax may be applied to purchases by non1. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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Indians on such lands. In addition, the court held that sales by the
tribe to Indians not on trust lands are immune from state tax.
However, the court held that the return to the tribe of monies collected is improper as the tax imposed was on the buyers and only
they can seek a refund.
TRIBAL PROPERTY: Congressionally Diminished Reservation
In June of 1972, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe sued in the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota, to obtain a
declaratory judgment that the original boundaries of their reservation, as defined in the Act of March 2, 1889, had not been
diminished by three subsequent acts of Congress passed in 1904,
1907, and 1910. The district court concluded that Congress had intended to diminish the reservation, and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Rehnquist,' affirmed the court of appeals.
The Court concluded that although unilateral acts of Congress
were enacted without the consent of three-fourths of the adult
male members of the tribe as required by the original treaty, this
was of no consequence in determining the intent of Congress to
diminish the boundaries of the reservation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court put great reliance on the fact that had a 1901
amendment to the treaty been accepted by Congress, the reservation would have been diminished. The Rosebud Tribe had approved
the cession of certain reservation lands to the United States
government in return for certain payments. The Congress refused
the terms of payment offered by the Rosebud Tribe, and instead,
in 1904, passed an act substantially the same as the 1901 amendment, the only change being that which concerned payments to
the tribe in return for the land. The Supreme Court held that the
only point of contention between the 1901 amendment and the
1904 act involved method of payment and not the intent to
diminish. Finding the intent sufficient, the Court held that
Gregory County was clearly separated from the Rosebud Reservation in 1904. In 1907, an agreement was signed by a majority of
the adult male Indians, to cede all land in Tripp and Lyman counties to the United States government. Congress incorporated the
terms of the treaty into a bill that was enacted into law. This act
was substantially the same as the 1904 act, and thus, Congress
reaffirmed its intent to diminish the reservation. An act passed in
1. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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1910 by Congress contained terms similar to those found in earlier
acts and detached Mellette County from the reservation.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, attacked the reasoning of the majority concerning the intent to diminish the reservation. Justice Marshall carefully pointed out all the evidence contrary to the position taken by
the majority, and found that the majority view went against
established case law. Past cases, such as Mattz v. Arnett,2 and
DeCoteau v. District County Court,' held that the intent to
disestablish the boundaries of a reservation must be clear on its
face, with all ambiguities resolved in favor of the Indians involved.
The majority was apparently adopting a new view of intent to
diminish, and this may threaten other reservations with similar
circumstances. Justice Marshall also pointed out other problems
that may result from the majority decision, such as jurisdictional
disputes, clouds on title to real property, and problems with
federal funding to Indians outside the reservation.
TRIBAL PROPERTY: Congressionally Diminished Reservation
Two groups of cases were joined together in this appeal. The first
group of cases arose from indictments against Long Elk and four
other Indians, for offenses committed within Indian country, that
being the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The second group of
cases arose from indictments against Bird Horse and another Indian, for offenses also committed on part of the Standing Rock
Reservation. The issue raised on appeal in United States v. Long
Elk' is whether federal jurisdiction exists over criminal offenses
committed within that portion of the Standing Rock Indian Reservation opened to settlement by a 1913 congressional enactment.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the jurisdictional
issue in light of principles enunciated in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip,2 and held that the Act of 1913 did not disestablish any part
of the Standing Rock Reservation. The particular portion of the
reservation under consideration was the eastern half. The court
distinguished the facts in this case from the Rosebud case, finding
no intent of Congress to terminate the reservation status either in
the language in the act which opened the reservation to settlement
or in negotiations with the tribe. Furthermore, the legislative
2.
3.
1.
2.

412 U.S. 481 (1973).
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
565 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1977).
430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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history of the Act of 1913 does not disclose an intention to terminate the reservation status of the opened land, and the Presidential proclamation opening the land contained no language of termination. The states of South Dakota and North Dakota have
never exercised jurisdiction over the part of the reservation affected by the act. Finally, the Act of 1913 opened only a small portion of the reservation, and those plots were interspersed among
tracts allotted to Indians. The court concluded that the eastern
part of the reservation was not disestablished and, therefore,
federal jurisdiction over all defendants is sustained.
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